Friday, April 21, 2006

East Timor in the News


I thought I was hearing things when I caught the end of the BBC report while driving home a few nights ago. I can't remember the last time I heard anything about East Timor on an American radio station. Predictably, it was bad news. It seems that Human Rights Watch has credible testimony about police abuse in East Timor -- unlawful detentions and beatings of detainees. What's worse, is that the East Timorese government has so far done little to investigate the reports.

Part of the BBC report, and others that I've read, have hinted that the situation flirts with the old ways of brutality and abuses when East Timor was illegally occupied by Indonesian soldiers, and that the East Timorese struggled for so long to achieve independence from the Indonesian occupation only to slowly start mimicking the oppressive ways to which they became accustomed. I think this comparison is premature and unfair, even though it might be what's needed to stir the government to take quick action to investigate its police force. Nothing could shame the East Timorese leadership more than for any part of their new state to be compared to the 25-year occupation from which they finally won freedom in 1999.

The problem with the police force could have been predicted. In 1999, when the United Nations arrived in East Timor, what they found was that the only real East Timorese institution was the Catholic Church. After the East Timorese population overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia in the UN-sponsored referendum, nearly all of the Indonesian administrators and professionals in the territory fled, never to return. Indigenous East Timorese hadn't been allowed to hold any sort of professional positions under the Indonesian occupation. This included the police force, which was largely comprised of ethnic Indonesians from Java. After the vote for independence, all of the Indonesian professionals, managers, and administrators left; so did the institutions they were part of.

After the vote for independence, a mulitlateral military force secured the chaotic territory, and a UN administration was created. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was given the broadest mandate ever afforded to a UN mission. UNTAET was tasked with rebuilding the devastated territory, administering it until an indigenous government could be established, and creating and building local institutions. The East Timorese police force was one of the institutions that was extremely difficult to get off the ground. The creation of the police force fell months behind schedule, and the timeline created for training the new recruits by international civilian police officers fell even further behind. By the time UNTAET had turned over all of its adminstrative functions to local officials and East Timor declared its official independence in 2002, the police force that had been created, along with the the entire criminal and judicial system, was a weak institution at best. Some UN police remained in advisory roles for several years after 2002, but by 2005, were almost entirely gone.

The reports of recent police abuses in East Timor are terrible and should be of great concern. What we're seeing is the result of a barely functioning institution that was built between 1999 and 2002. But admittedly, that is a very short time to create a national police force (or any other national institution for that matter) especially when the UN was starting from scratch.

But things are not like they were during the Indonesian occupation. East Timor is a fragile state, but it is a more open state. What it enjoys now that it didn't for most of the Indonesian occupation is much greater press freedom. The reports of abuses by the police force in this case were almost immediate. Likewise, the pressure that the East Timorese government is feeling to take action about the reports has been immediate.

East Timor gained its freedom in part because media access to, and interest in, the local situation increased dramatically in the few years leading up to the referendum. Now, access to the new country is much greater than it was during those years. Access to information is now available in East Timor. If the government fails to investigate the police behavior, or to act on the findings, we will know about it.

The problem with the world's most oppresive regimes is that information access to those places is so limited. It is difficult for a police force or a government to carry our violent acts of agression against its own citizens in a house full of windows.

Thursday, April 13, 2006

The Thin Line Between Sumo and Iran/U.S. Relations



Call it procrastination. Call it a need for a brain break. Call it what you will. But whatever the reason, I found myself channel surfing today in the early afternoon when I should have been working on a research paper. With remote control in hand, I pretended (to myself because no one else would care) that I wanted to get the weather forecast. With both my thumb and mind wandering, I somehow managed to find a sports channel that was showing an international Sumo competition. Perhaps I watched for too long -- at least 30 minutes -- but as I watched a 400 pound man from the Netherlands or Norway (I can't remember) get tossed to his knees by a leaner, meaner 260-pounder from one of the former Soviet Republics, I couldn't help but imagine the whole thing as a metaphor for International Relations. I realize that Sumo is a traditional Japanese sport and way of life that is more than 1500 years old, but you have to admit that there's something absurd about two gigantic, often very obese men, slapping and stomping around in a circle wearing nothing but their thong tha thongs. The sport has grown past its Japanese roots, with men from around the world now seeking fame and fortune within Japan, and internationalized competitions being held outside Japan in venues as large as New York's Madison Square Garden. According to the announcer on television, it is the world's fastest growing sport. I'm not particularly concerned with that sort of data, so I'll take his word for it.

I suppose the absurdity -- and the spiraling madness of procrastination -- is what got me stuck on this strained metaphor. That and the absurdity of the U.S. and Iran posturing like bloated men in g-strings over the Iranian nuclear issue.

The field of International Relations is relatively new, but the current schools of thought have evolved and branched out considerably from the early ruminations on the nature of war a la Thucydides, or the 16th Century political thoughts of Machiavelli. I'm not going to give a rundown of the etymology of the different branches, but for simplicity, let's just consider Sumo wrestlers in realist terms. Realism in international relations (IR) theory has fallen out of favor in recent years, much to the chagrin of our old pal Henry Kissinger, but for certain situations, classic realist theory lends a nice, tidy way to examine some things -- or to at least understand the doctrine from which some of our foreign policy peeps are working. Here are some of the major assumptions of realist thought:


  • The international system exists in a state of anarchy in the sense that there is no coordinating body or entity that gives order to the world.
  • The most important players in the international arena are sovereign entities called states.
  • Ultimate authority lies with the state, and as such, there is no higher authority over the state.
  • States are rational, self-interested, unitary actors that have difficulty trusting other states.
  • Because states act out of self-interest, cooperation between and among states exists only when it coincides with the interests of the cooperating states.
  • State interests are best ensured through military and economic power.
  • Power is best described in terms of zero-sum outcomes, where gain by one actor (a state in this case) is balanced by an equal, corresponding loss by another actor.

There are plenty of criticisms of realism and neorealism. Non-state actors such as the United Nations, other Intergovernmental Organizations, multinational corporations, and even terrorist groups, have proved to be important in international relations. Cooperation cannot always be traced to self-interest. Many scholars find holes in the zero-sum approach to power relations. Evidence can be provided that states don't always act unitarily or rationally. Many of the problems in our modern world don't involve state on state conflict (think Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan). The criticisms are numerous, but I'm in no position to lecture on the theoretical critiques.

For some reason though, when I think of the current situation with Iran, there's something about it that seems similar to nearly naked fat dudes trying to push each other around. Sure, I know there are non-state actors that are important in the Iranian nuclear issue. And I know that there are states other than Iran and the U.S. that might be important before this finally plays out. Much talk has centered on getting China and Russia more involved, and the European Union -- another often-used example of how the realist paradigm fails -- has been just as quick as the U.S. to condemn Iran's thumbing it's nose at the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). But the whole thing is shaping up like the Sumo tournament, where the final match comes down to big, fat, bloated United States vs. The leaner, meaner Iran. The U.S. tries to push its weight around, while Iran attempts to outmanouver its larger opponent with cunning and quickness. Needless to say, I saw a few too many matches on television today where the big fat guy fell on his face after being deftly outfoxed by a smaller, quicker wrestler.

The U.S. and Iran are approaching this as a zero-sum game. The U.S. feels that any level of Uranium enrichment for any purpose by Iran would represent a loss, and Iran feels that any concession that doesn't allow it to pursue a unilateral program would be a loss. They think it's as simple as the Sumo match, where one win equals one loss. Besides, these two states are entering into the arena much too early. Wouldn't it be better just to sit on the couch, eat potato chips and watch reruns of your favorite shows, than to strip down to your tighties and get in the ring with a big ugly meanie? Unfortunately, neither of these states thinks so.

Estimates vary widely, but even the least optimistic puts a fully developed Iranian nuclear weapon at five years away, and some estimates state ten years. However, the Bush administration seems too eager to get into the circle. An absolutely frightening report in The New Yorker by Seymour Hersch states that information from Washington insiders points to the administration's ridiculous talks of bunker busting nuclear weapons that could be used to destroy Iran's underground nuclear facilities. I hope that this is akin to the Sumo wrestler's ritual of slapping his legs and stomping back and forth to intimidate the other wrestler before the match starts because if they are considering this as a real option, then there is no hope for us.

In case the implications of that aren't clear, let me summarize: They are talking about using nuclear weapons to prove to the world that it's bad to have nuclear weapons!

Any preemptive action would be ludicrous. Iraq? Hello? Is the administration hell bent on destroying the world? I think a more sobering and eloquent way of stating this can be found in Hersch's article. One of his unnamed sources, a "Pentagon advisor on the war on terror," said, "What will 1.2 billion Muslims think the day we attack Iran?" I think the big fat bloated Sumo wrestler just lost his undies and showed his ass.

If there's a message I'm getting at it's this: Don't get in the circle. There is plenty of time to give diplomatic solutions a chance. As Heather Hurlburt correctly pointed out in the Democracy Arsenal blog, Iran is not the Cuban Missile Crisis. Unlike that event, there is plenty of time for diplomacy with Iran.

On the other hand, if Bush and Iranian President Ahmadinejad stripped down, donned those funny looking loin cloths, and started pushing each other around a circle, it might be funny enough to reverse several years of bad blood. Who needs the IAEA when you have Sumo?

Photo of "sumo throwing salt" by alebah at stock.xchng

Saturday, April 01, 2006

Forgotten Burma


It is sometimes easy to forget that totalitarian states such as Burma still exist. A quick glimpse of the website of one of the few daily newspapers in the country reveals little more than the facade created by government propaganda. Front page news is no more than a series of positive press releases about the government: "Armed Forces Day Exhibition Packed With Visitors." Other inane stories are about nothing: "Basic Tailoring Course Concludes in Salingyi"(Yes, this is a headline on the main page). Try as you might, you won't find a single critical word about the ruling junta or any of its officials. In fact, there's little difference at all between the daily newspapers I found, and the official government website.

In the book, "Finding George Orwell in Burma", author Emma Larkin -- a pseudonym -- brilliantly compares the current state of Burma to the state of Oceania in Orwell's "1984." The dissemination of information in Burma, Larkin writes, is similar to The Party's "newspeak," in "1984." It's a great book, one of the most original pieces of travel writing I've read, and a disturbing study of totalitarianism and its effects. She bases her travels loosely around biographical accounts of the time Orwell spent in Burma with the British Imperial Police, and on the Burma of Orwell's first novel "Burmese Days". What she finds in Burma is a true Orwellian nightmare: a government that controls everything, a population afraid to speak, government informants everywhere, people jailed without reason, and others vanishing altogether.

Her account of the country from the inside parallels reports by human rights groups. Reading an Amnesty International profile of Myanmar is like reading a list of all of the human rights abuses that are possible: violent oppression of ethnic minorities, extrajudicial executions, political prisoners, torture, forced labor. The list is lengthy, and helped the Burmese government earn the dubious honor of being one of the world's most oppressive regimes in 2005.

Some talk of allowing opposition parties, especially the National League for Democracy (NLD), to take part in constitutional reform, was initiated in 2003, but quickly failed. In 2005, General Khin Nyunt, prime minister and perhaps one of the more moderate voices in the military regime, was removed from office and placed under house arrest. Several top officials thought to be loyal to him were also removed and arrested, quelling hope of government reform.

Currently, the outspoken leader of the NLD and Nobel Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi is still under house arrest. She has been in jail or under house arrest in Burma for 10 of the past 16 years.

But there's hope for Burma's future. The tireless work of dissidents such as Aung San Suu Kyi trying to get information out, of writers such as Larkin telling the Burmese story, of human rights groups pressuring governments to take stronger policy stances on Burmese affairs, and of the diplomacy of other countries will gradually erode the junta's hold. Some of Burma's closest neighbors have grown weary of the isolationism and uncooperative nature of the junta. Several neighboring states are beginning to pressure the regime to release thousands of political prisoners, and to take a quicker path to democratic reform. A report by Associated Press writer Sean Yoong outlined a recent attempt by officials from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to pressure the Burmese leadership. According to the report some ASEAN members have even talked of seeking to expel Myanmar from Association. But ultimately, cooperation from China and India is needed to help bring about change in Myanmar. So far, China, traditionally Burma's closest ally, and India, which is seeking closer economic ties with the country, have refused to push Burma toward reform.

China's reluctance is understandable: It has little desire to push one of its neighbors toward democracy, an act that could easily create a giant mirror, reflecting its own penchant for squashing opposition and imprisoning dissidents. But helping lead Burma down a more benevolent path could prove to soften the edges of its own international image. And the liberalization of the Burmese economy that would result from democratic reform would prove beneficial to both China and India as they seek greater economic ties with their neighbor in a globalized world.

In Orwell's "1984," the majority of the population of Oceania have been conditioned to a point of thoughtlessness. The only character who is really worth writing about is Winston Smith, who secretly begins a diary, an act of self-expression punishable by death in Oceania. But what Emma Larkin finds in Burma is a population full of passionate free-thinkers. Though their outlets for expression are limited, and poets and teachers have often been imprisoned, Burma's ruling junta has yet to be able to infiltrate the space of the Burmese mind. Free thought flourishes in the people Larkin encounters.

Another difference between the world of "1984" and our modern world is that in Orwell's world, all nations had merged to become three giant, powerful countries. But Burma, in today's international system, is one of many impoverished states, highly susceptible to the wills, wishes and political economies of larger states.

The ruling military of Burma faces pressure from the outside and from within. The government isn't strong enough to face pressure on two fronts. A little nudge from powerful states such as India and China would help, but even without those efforts, Burma's government will eventually collapse. In "1984" The Party of Oceania and the will of Big Brother is unstoppable, but in the case of Burma, history, rather than literature, provides a better glimpse of Burma's future. It may take time, but totalitarian regimes eventually fall.

Let's hope, for the sake of the Burmese people, that change comes sooner than later.


Use THIS LINK to find out what you can do about Myanmar's use of child soldiers.
and HERE for the Free Burma website.
or
HERE to read "Outside" magazine writer Mark Jenkins' fascinating account of trying to sneak into Burma.

Monday, March 20, 2006

You are here


You are here
Originally uploaded by Riot Sauce.
Welcome to the world.

Thursday, February 23, 2006

A story of integration and disintegration

On the eve of May 20, 2002, I was hopeful, even elated. I attended, in a remote, Southwestern district of East Timor called Suai, the first independence celebration of the world's newest officially recognized sovereign state. The celebration was held in a soccer field, and was a tiny replica of a much larger celebration being held in Dili, East Timor's capital city. The East Timorese struggle for Independence from an Indonesian occupation, and from their former colonizer, Portugal had culminated with international recognition of a viable new country.

There was reason to be hopeful. And the general mood of the thousands of people in the small soccer field watching traditional tribal dancers and listening to speeches by the East Timorese district leaders and United Nations representatives was one of pure benevolence and goodwill. You could feel it. The people of East Timor were ecstatic and proud, and they deserved to feel that way, having struggled for so long to achieve statehood, and having sacrificed so much during that struggle.

That night marked the culmination not just of the struggle for independence by the East Timorese. It also represented, at least on the surface, a real situation that gave credence to the idea of international institutionalism. The East Timorese situation, from the help received by international NGOs and human rights groups during the Indonesian occupation, to the UN-administered referendum for independence, through a 3-year period of UN administration, seemed to mark a glowing success for international cooperation. It seemed that the international community had done something right.

But every silver lining is part of a darker cloud. And sitting here, safely back in the U.S. several years after that night, I can't help but think that the dark cloud of international cooperation is about to burst. I hope I'm being pessimistic. But when the issue of East Timor's recent history is examined contextually, it is troubling. Indonesia's illegal annexation by Indonesia went unchecked by the international community 25 years. And even on the eve of East Timor's independence, one only had to scratch the surface of the new state to find that the brief legacy of UN administration had given birth to a country with barely functioning institutions. Four years later, East Timor is a microstate with little ability to support or to defend itself, almost entirely dependent on international aid. A recent article in The Times of London reported that East Timor is the poorest country in East Asia. But a major part of East Timor's depressed situation is the legacy left by years of Indonesian occupation, and the report notes that the poorest and most vulnerable members of East Timor's population are those living in the countryside who were widowed or orphaned by the Indonesian military or pro-Indonesian militias.

This paints a difficult portrait of one small country, at once a shining example of the international community in action, and a grim picture of its failures. Sometimes nationalist urges give people hope and a promise of a new existence, and sometimes the push toward nationalism leads to the disintegration of states and territories. Whether East Timor's long quest for independence as a nation will lead to its eventual collapse remains to be seen, but I suspect that it is far too early to throw in the towel for these resilient people.